German Economy Watch

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Europe's Economies Move Sideways In June

The eurozone economies moved sideways in June, with the flash reading on the composite purchasing managers index (which covers both industry and services) for the 16 nation euro area rising to 44.4, fractionally above the 44 registered in May. So we are just where we were before, contracting more slowly than in Q1, but still contracting, and the fiscal bullet is now almost spent.

Not without importance was that the reading came in significantly weaker than the consensus expectation for a sharp increase to 45.3. So the market *has* been getting ahead of itself.

On the face of it, the index is now consistent with a quarterly drop in GDP of around 0.5 percent, well below the 2.5 percent fall registered in the first quarter. However - as Capital Economic's Ben May notes - "the index has recently been a poor predictor of growth and the hard data have painted a less upbeat picture."

The situation was broadly as expected on the manufacturing front - with a rise to 42.4 from 40.7, but this is still quite a strong contraction. On the one hand the improvement in the factory index is pretty generalized and so, with the new orders-stock ratio rising further, there should be further improvement in the coming months. On the other, given that this upward trend in the factory index is mostly inventory-driven, caution needs to be exercised in extrapolating the tendency to the whole economy.

Ben May also points out that the drop in the services PMI from 44.8 to 44.5 suggests that fiscal and monetary stimulus measures "are yet to have a significant impact on domestic demand." Maybe we could rephrase that slightly, their bolt seems to have been shot without result, and the fiscal element, at least in Germany, Spain and Italy will now increasingly have a constraining impact.

German Contraction Worsens

More worryingly, the rate of contraction in Germany's private sector accelerated slightly this month, with flash estimate of the Markit composite PMI falling to 43.4 from the seven-month high of 44.0 in May.The flash estimate for the manufacturing PMI index rose to 40.5 from 39.6 in May, but the flash services PMI reading fell to 44.3 from 45.2 last month. And in the manufacturing sector the ratio of new orders to stocks of finished goods fell back to 1.12 after rising to 1.18 in May. Which effectively means inventories started to rise again.

French Economy On The Mend

On the other hand, conditions in the French improved for the fourth straight month in June, helped by much slower falls in the level of new orders. The flash estimate for the Markit/CDAF PMI rose to 47.7 in June compared with 46.6 in May.

The key to the improvement - according to Markit - was a sharp jump in the composite new orders index, which hit 48.3 compared to May's reading of 45.3, suggesting that demand in the euro zone's second largest economy is steadily on the mend. "The composite new orders index is getting close to stabilisation. We're still very much on course for a strong easing and it does suggest that by the end of the year we could be seeing growth again in France," according to Chris Williamson, chief economist at Markit.

The June manufacturing PMI rose to 45.5 from 43.3, the slowest pace of contraction in activity since August last year. However, Markit cautioned against taking an overly optimistic view of the data, stressing that conditions in the French economy remain fragile, and recovery is likely to be unstable.

Just how fragile was emphasised by the fact that the services sector PMI slipped back to 47.5 from 48.3 in May, following three consecutive monthly increases.

And just to underline the fragility part, we learnt today that spending by French consumers on manufactured goods fell in May, led by a sharp drop in purchases of clothing and household goods, according to the statistics office INSEE today (Tuesday). Consumer spending fell 0.2 percent month-on-month in May, well below a consensus forecast for a rise of 0.2 percent. Total consumption in May was down 1.6 percent compared to May 2008.

That having been said, I have no doubt, and unequivocally, to say that as far as I am concerned France is the strongest (or least weak) economy among the EU big five (France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain) at the moment.

Consumer Sentiment Also Stable In June

GfK AG’s forward looking German consumer sentiment index for July increased to 2.9 from a revised 2.6 in June. But sentiment is still on a very low level, and in general the story is the same as the IFO one yesterday, it's all about expectations. But are these expectations well founded?

With all the talk in the press and by politicians that the economic downturn may be coming to an end, consumer hopes of economic stabilization are intensifying and accordingly, economic expectations are increasing moderately. The fact that the employment market has remained fairly robust is likely to be one reason for this. Reports that the inflation rate stood at 0% in May are having a positive effect on income expectations and the propensity to buy.

Economic expectations increased for the third month in a row. The increase of 5.7 points is even more pronounced than in the two preceding months. The indicator currently stands at -22.6 points.

Economic pessimism is declining somewhat and consumers seem to be expecting that the steep economic decline can gradually be halted. Certainly, this increase in the indicator has been supported by the fact that the expected slump on the unemployment market has so far not materialized, and has been deferred by improved short-time working regulations. However, the indicator is still far too low to warrant talk of an incipient recovery from the perspective of consumers.

Following the slight drop last month, income expectations have once again recorded increases in June. The indicator has climbed 6 points to stand at -3.3, which is the highest value since April last year. The decrease in inflation and the prospects for pensioners of a significant boost to their received pension payments as of July 1, 2009 are certainly the important factors buoying up income expectations at present. These factors are counteracting creeping redundancy fears and have held at bay the negative effects on the indicator up to now. However, it is to be expected that the forecasted deterioration on the jobs market will increase these unemployment fears, and will place a great amount of strain on income expectations.

The propensity to buy not only retained its current level in June, but even improved slightly. Following an increase of 2 points this month, the indicator now stands at 14.5 points, which means that there has even been a considerable improvement of 38 points in comparison with the prior year. According to GfK the large decrease in inflation is currently stimulating the propensity to consume. Falling prices, for example as a result of the scrappage bonus, act as incentives to buy. Other industries are also implementing this type of price reduction, in order to encourage consumers to make further purchases.

Monday, June 22, 2009

German Business Confidence Up (Slightly)

German business confidence rose for the third month in a row in June. The Ifo institute in Munich reported that its business climate index, based on a survey of 7,000 executives, increased to 85.9 from 84.3 in May. The index reached a 26-year low of 82.2 in March. As far as I can see, this isn't exactly a whole big deal. Just more of the same for now.

In terms of areas of activity, retail sales show no improvement, construction is up slightly, and manufacturing keeps hovering near the bottom.

Ifo’s measure of expectations increased to 89.5 from 86 while a gauge of current conditions eased to 82.4 from 82.5. It is obvious that the current situation in June is no better than March - in fact the conditions are still the worst to date, and all the work is being done by "expectations". It would be really, really interesting to understand just what is driving those expectations.

Germany At A Glance, January 2008

Welcome to the German Economy Watch Blog. Below you will find the normal chronological blog posts. But first we would like to present some charts which provide background data and which we hope will help the first time reader better assess and get to grips with the argument being presented here. The big question which arose concerning the Germany economy in 2007 was whether or not the new found dynamism in German economic activity constituted some form of remaissance, and formed part of a global decoupling process whereby a sustainable recovery in domestic demand was taking place. Analysts on this blog never really accepted this view. The key question and central enigma associated with the German economy is really why domestic demand should have remained so congenitally weak over such a considerable period of time. Since this phenomenon is also to be observed in the the two other societes with very high (circa 43) population median ages - Italy and Japan - we postulate that demographics and population ageing processes offer some part of the explanation here. Basically what we can observe as societies move above the 40 median age mark are a number of stylised facts. Weakness in domestic private consumption would be one of these, absence of consumer credit driven property booms would be another, growing pressure on the national debt as the elderly dependence ratio steadily rises would be another, and growing dependence on export growth for sustaining GDP growth would be the central feature of the whole edifice. We hope you will find the background data presented here useful in assessing the argument which we are presenting on this blog, which is basically that a key component in the longer term growth stagnation from which Germany is suffering has its roots in the underlying demographics. Basically and in the long run (possibly with a 30 year lag) fertility does matter. Please click on thumbnails for better viewing.

What now follows which will be a very rough and ready attempt to describe in broad brush strokes how the contemporary German economy actually works. First off, and as is well known, German society is ageing, and at the same time the German population has started declining. Not only is Germany's median age rising, the proportion of the population in the key 25-49 age group is now falling.

As can be seen from the chart this crucial age group touched its highpoint in 1997/98. This could be thought of as the moment of maximum capacity for the German economy since it includes the crucial 25 to 40 household-former, first-time-homebuyer group. In terms of credit expansion, it is this group which drives a significant part of internal demand.

The age group also includes another important group, the 35 to 50 years one. This group drives an economy in productive terms, since these are the prime age workers. If you think of a society as a 100 metres sprint athlete, then there is an age when this athlete is at the maximum of his or her running potential, an age after which each time they can only run the 100 metres more slowly.

Well a society is the same in terms of its collective economic potential, without addressing underlying issues either through fertility or immigration, it can only move forward more and more slowly. Consumption becomes flat, and GDP growth - gioven the external dependence - fragile.

Private consumption has hovered pretty close to the 60% mark for many years now, while government consumption - after moving sharply upwards as a total share in the first half of the 1970s has subsequently remained pretty constant, moving around the 19% of GDP mark. The big difference has been in the importance of fixed capital formation (GFCF) which reached from 1975 to 2000hovered around the 22 - 24% of GDP mark.

Prior to 1975 GFCF was at a much higher level, while post 2000 it has dropped substantially And So what we can see is that the year between, say, 1975 and 2000, when GFCF remaind a more or less constant share of GDP, constituted - to use the language of neo-classical economics - the constant growth period of the German domestic economy.The years prior to 1975 were the convergence, or "catch-up" years

And especially the 1960s, after Germany finally broke out of the destruction and devastation of WWII - while the years after 2000 constitute what the neo-classicists would call the "balanced growth period", although as we can see, it isn't very balanced, and there certainly isn't a steady state.

2008 Forecasts: There is a consenus at the present time that the German economy is slowing. Where there is no real consensus is over the rate at which it is slowing and where and when it will settle. It is clear that GDP growth in 2007 will be below the heady 3.1% annual rate achieved in 2006. The OECD last December revised their 2007 German forecast down to 2.6%, and their 2008 one down to 1.8%. The IMF in their October World Economic Outlook forecast growth for 2007 at 2.4%, slowing to 2% in 2008. Morgan Stanley's Elga Bartsch, while optimistic that the German economy will whether the credit crunch better than most (and here she may well be right) is somewhat more sanguine, putting 2008 growth at 1.5%. In general though I rather doubt her overview that "Germany could well be on the way to becoming the new growth locomotive in Europe." and especially her suggestion that "the phase of underperformance in terms of GDP growth, which has plagued Europe’s largest economy for years, is clearly over." Unfortunately, what we are arguing on this blog is that Germany's GDP growth rates since the mid 1990s are not some special kind of "underperformance", but what can be expected from a society with a rapidly rising median age which is increasingly dependent on exports rather than domestic consumption for growth.

The EU commission in it's November 2007 forecast was also convinced that the German economy was now on a "solid growth path", forecasting 2.5% growth for 2007 and 2.1% for 2008. I personally will be very surprised if we see growth in the region of 2% for the German economy in 2008, and I even consider the 1.8% from the OECD and 1.5% from Morgan Stanley still on the high side given the extent of downside risk. Basically the reasonably favourable depreciation rules which currently apply to German investment have been changed as of 1 January 2008, and we might reasonably expect to see some sort of impact on investment comparable with the negative shock which hit private domestic consumption following the VAT rise on 1 Jan 2007. In addition all the indications suggest that German consumption will continue to be weak in 2008. So if consumer consumption is at best flat, governemnt consumption equally so, and investment and construction weakening, we are simply lefy with export growth, and here the outlook is definitely more negative in 2008 than it was in 2007. The Spanish economy (one important German customer) is visibly wilting by the day, as is the UK (another big customer), but it is to Eastern Europe we must look for the biggest impact on German exports of any correction in 2008. Just one data point should suffice, Germany exports roughly the same value of goods to the Czech Republic (and more to Poland) as it does to China. This means that Geramny is proportionately not that exposed to any slowdown in China, but hugely exposed to any sudden shift in growth and demand in the East of Europe.

So I would say, that on current data, 1% growth in Germany in 2008 look a reasonable estimate at this point, but that this needs to be taken to mean with considerable downside risk. Germany is now tremendously dependent on what happens elsewhere, and until what does actually happen elsewhere becomes clearer it is difficult to be more precise on Germany. The only apparent bright spot on the horizon is employment, but I am dubious that in the context of Germany's ageing workforce this will work through as some are hoping, as I expain at some considerable length in this post here. My opinion is that Germany will enter recession at some point during 2008, and that we may well have 2 consecutive quarters of negative growth. The continuing high euro will maintain pressure on German exports, and high oil and food prices will maintain pressure on the inflation front, at least in the first half of 2008. The ECB will probably switch stance towards rate reductions at some point, but since, as Elga Bartsch among many others so eloquently argues German internal consumption and investment are not especially dependent on credit conditions, easing from the ECB may not have as much impact as one would hope for.